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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GROVER THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN E. HARRIS, Warden of the 
Utah State Penitentiary, 
Defendant. 
CARL ROLLAND DEMMICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN E. HARRIS, Warden of the 
Utah State Penitentiary, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 6655 
Case No. 6656 
The Plaintiffs in each of these cases were convicted 
in a court of general jurisdiction of felonies and the 
punishment was enhanced in each case under the provi-
sions of 103-1-18 R.S.U. 1933. Apparently their conten-
tion is that they are entitled to an immediate and un-
conditional discharge, and they apparently desire that 
this Court treat these proceedings in habeas corpus as 
an appeal 
The statement of the case contained in the Plain-
tiffs' brief sets forth verbatim the informations, verdicts, 
sentences and committments in the cases in which the 
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Plaintiffs were committed to the custody of the Defend-
ant herein. In view of the opinion in Jensen vs. Sevy, 
Utah, 134 P. 2d 1081, it is doubtful that these are prop-
erly before the Court at this time because the applica-
tions for the writ, wherein these matters are alleged, 
had served their purpose when the writ was issued and 
are now functus officio. We have no desire to raise any 
procedural matters and will consider that all of these 
things are properly before the Court. It is our position 
that in these habeas corpus proceedings only Point 2 
contained in Plaintiff's brief is here ,material, that is, 
whether or not section 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933, has been 
repealed. 
It is also our position that the Plaintiffs cannot in 
any event be discharged even though this Court should 
hold the judgment void but they should be remanded 
to the Defendant herein to be taken before the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, there to have imposed upon them 
a sentence for the felonies of which they were convicted 
without the enhancement of punishment provided . for 
by said section 103-1-18. Ex parte Folck, Folckvs. yv at-
son, 102 Utah 470, 132 P. 2d. 1_30 (1942). 
Or this Court under the authority of Mutart- -vs~ 
Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67, could hold the ·sentence 
imposed to be one for the indeterminate term~ as provid-
ed by law for felonies or which Plaintiffs were properly 
convicted. 
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POINTS INVOLVED 
Point 1. In these habeas corpus proceedings the 
Court is limited to a determination of whether section 
103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 has been repealed. 
Point 2. Section 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933, has not been 
repealed by implication or otherwise. 
Point 3. In each case it appears from the informa-
tion thet Plaintiffs herein had been each twice sentenced 
and committed to prison for terms of not less than three 
years previous to the crime charged therein. 
Point 4. The verdicts in both cases here involved 
were proper and legal. 
Point 5. Under section 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933, it 
was not necessary that Plaintiffs had been convicted 
of three felonies before proceedings could be commenced 
to determine whether they were habitual criminals. 
Point 6. The committment of Demmick was legal. 
POINT 1 
IN THESE HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT IS Lil\1ITED TO A DETERMINATION 
OF WHETHER SECTION 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 HAS 
BEEN REPEALED. 
It is stated in 25 Am. Jur. 159, Habeas Corpus, 
section 26, that: 
''The primary and, ordinarily, the only ques-
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4 
tion involved in habeas corpus proceedings is one 
of jurisdiction-namely, whether the particular 
order, judgment or process whose validity is at-
tacked is one coming within the lawful authority 
of the court or officer making or issuing it. As it 
may otherwise be stated, in the absence of statu-
tory provision to the contrary, the scope of in-
quiry, where restraint is had by virtue of legal 
process, is ordinarily limited to the validity of 
the process on its face and the jurisdiction of the 
court by which it was issued. The writ does not 
lie to correct errors and irregularities committed 
in the exercise of jurisdiction; but cognizance is 
taken only of such defects as render absolutely 
void the proceedings under which the petitioner 
is imprisoned. In short, the writ reaches juris-
dictional error only; it cannot properly be used 
to serve the mere purpose of an appeal or writ 
of error." 
Plain·~iffs attack the proceedings under which they 
were committed to prison on the following grounds, 
(1) that the statute authorizing enhancement of sen-
tence had been repealed, (2) the sentences and committ-
ments in the previous convictions relied upon were not 
for not less than three years, (3) the verdicts were im-
proper because of the defective information, ( 4) that the 
court could not try Plaintiffs until there had been a con-
viction of three felonies and ( 5) in the case of Demmick, 
that the committment could not issue without a hearing. 
A punishment imposed pursuant to a statute that 
had been repealed would concededly be an act in excess 
of jurisdiction. But even if this is so we submit that 
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Plaintiffs are not entitled to an unconditional discharge. 
Under Point 2 herein we contend there has been no repeal 
of 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933. 
1J nder the second ground of attack certainly the trial 
court had the authority to construe the section 103-1-18 
and to make a determination of whether the sentences 
and committments alleged in the informations as pre-
vious offenses cmne within the meaning of said section. 
Its determination might be error but that is not an act 
in excess of its jurisdiction. This Court has held that 
it was within the jurisdiction of a trial court to construe 
and make application of statutes. Bleon vs. Emery, 60 
Utah 582, 209 P. 627 (1922) wherein it was said: 
"l\ioreover, counsel, in his petition for a re-
hearing, entirely ignores the fact that in view that 
the decision is rendered in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding this court was restricted to the question 
of whether the statute is valid or invalid. It is 
elementary that mere errors of construction or 
judgment, whether committed by a court or by 
some board or officer, cannot be reviewed in a 
habeas corpus proceeding.'' 1 Bailey on Habeas 
Corpus, 30; Bruce vs. East, Sheriff, 43 Utah, 327, 
134 Pac. 1175, and cases there cited. 
If the Plaintiffs here were dissatisfied with the 
rulings made their remedy was to appeal. 
Pb.intiffs seem to take the position that this Court 
in these proceedings can make a determination of whether 
the sentences and committments alleged in the informa-
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6 
tions come within 103-1-18 on the theory that this Court 
can now determine whether the informations stated 
public offenses. Such cannot be done in habeas corpus. 
Areson vs. Pincock 62 Utah 527, 220 P. 503 (1923); Bruce 
vs. East 43 Utah 327, 134- P. 1175. In each of these cases 
contention was made that the pleadings under which 
punishment was imposed did not state public offenses 
but it was held that the courts wherein they were filed 
had jurisdiction to determine that matter and hence the 
failure to state a public offense was not grounds for 
discharge in habeas corpus. 
This Court in Areson vs. Pincock, supra, in speak-
ing of thP. sufficiency of a complaint stated: 
''But the question is not one of jurisdiction, 
and may not be inquired into in habeas corpus 
proceedings. It cannot be denied that the court 
had jurisdiction generally to try the issues and 
make the order complained of. Habeas corpus 
takes cognizance only of defects of a jurisdictional 
character, which render the proceedings not mere-
ly voidable, but absolutely void. Bruce vs. East, 
43 Utah, 327, 134 Pac. 1175. The rule is well 
settled and is supported by many cases. See an-
notation to Ex parte Robinson, L. R. A. 1918B, 
1148. The following excerpt from the annotation 
above referred to indicates the extent to which 
the rule is applied: 
"It has been said that, if from the accusa-
tions the court can deduce that the prosecutor 
intended to charge an act which is a crime, habeas 
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corpus will not lie, however defectively the act 
is described; also that if the indictn1ent or inform-
ation purports or atte1npts to state an offense, 
and the court has jurisdiction to pass upon the 
sufficiency of those statements, the defendants 
after conviction will not be released on habeas 
corpus; and that, 'if a crin1inal charge is color-
able', or "sufficient to set the judicial mind in 
motion" or to call upon it to act, or makes some 
approach towards charging a criminal offense, or 
iutimates the facts necessary to constitute the of-
fense and a purpose to declare thereon, or tends 
to show a criminal offense, no matter how in-
formal or defective, or has a legal tendency to 
prove each requirement of the statute, it will 
shield the proceedings from collateral attack. In 
a word, no errors or irregularities not going to 
the question of jurisdiction are reviewable on 
habeas corpus.' The rule has been laid down in 
several cases involving the sufficiency of com-
plaints to charge misdemeanors, although prob-
ably the doctrine was not intended to be limited 
to this class of cases, that after trial and convic-
tion for an alleged misdemeanor a prisoner will 
not be liberated on a writ of habeas corpus be-
cause of the insufficiency of the complaint, if, by 
any possible construction of the language em-
ployed therein, an offense against the law is there-
by even defectively stated.' 
In re Gregory, 219 U. S. 210, 31 Sup. Ct. 143, 
55 L Ed. 184, Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for 
the court, in a case where colorable questions were 
presented by the information and evidence, stated 
the rule as follows : 
'A habeas corpus proceeding cnnnot be made 
to perform the function of a writ of error and 
we are not concerned with the question whether 
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8 
the information was sufficient or whether the 
acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted 
a crime, that is to say, whether the court properly 
applied the law, if it be found that the court had 
jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the 
judgment'.'' 
In the annotation found at 57 A.L.R. 85 on ''Habeas 
corpus to test the sufficiency of indictment or informa-
tion as regards the offense sought to be charged,'' it 
is said: 
"* * * it has been held that where a criminal 
proceeding is pending in a court of general juris-
diction, the indictment or information purporting 
or attempting to state an offense of which the 
court has jurisdiction, the question whether the 
facts charged are sufficient to constitute an of-
fense of that kind will not be examined into on a 
ccllateral attack. In other words, if it can be de-
duced from the accusation that the prosecutor 
intended to charge an act or an omission which 
amounted to a crime known to the law, the court 
has jurisdiction and habeas corpus will not lie, 
however, defectively, the act or omission be 
described. But if the act or omission charged or 
attempted to be charged as an offense, is not a 
crime known to the law, then the court is without 
jurisdiction, and its judgment is a nullity." 
In Convey vs. Haynes, 230 Iowa 485, 298 N.W. 647 
(1941) it was held that a petitioner in habeas corpus 
cannot question the sufficiency of -the indictment or in-
formation under which he was imprisoned unless the act 
charged does not constitute an offense because the stat. 
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ute is unconstitutional or where there is a total failure 
to allege any offense kno,vn to the law. 
Certainly in the case at bar there is known to the 
law the offenses of burglary, grand larceny, and robbery 
and it is known to the law that punishn1ents thereof are 
enlu:nced by the perpetrator thereof being an habitual 
criminal. This is what was attempted, at least, to be 
alleged in the informations involved. The courts in those 
proceedings had jurisdiction to determine whether the 
allegations were sufficient. 
Ex parte Bailey, 60 Old. Cr. 278, 64 P. 2d 278 (1936) 
cited by Plaintiffs does not aid them in this regard. 
There is no statute in Oklahoma using the words habitual 
criminal. The Penal Code there refers only to ''Second 
Offenses." The judgment was for being an habitual 
crimi:na.l and the court stated it should have been for the 
offense of petit larceny, second and subsequent offense. 
In Utah our statute does refer to being an habitual 
criminal. 
In the Thompson case, for instance, the information, 
the verdict, and the sentence were for robbery and being 
an habitual criminal. This could only mean under our 
statutes that he had committed robbery and had been 
twice proviously convicted of felonies. 
The verdicts in these cases follow the informations 
and the court certainly had jurisdiction to submit these 
to the jury. 
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Plaintiffs next contention is that there could be no 
finding that they were habitual criminals nor could pro-
ceedings be had to determine that question until after 
the third conviction. We submit that this is a mere mat-
ter of procedure and cannot be inquired into in habeas 
corpus. Ex parte Hayes 15 Utah 77, 47 P. 612 (1897); 
Convey vs. Haynes, supra; in re Stone, 295 J\iich. 207, 
294 N.W. 156 (1940); In re Bates, Idaho, 125 P. (2) 
1017 (1942). 
In Ex parte Hayes, supra, the petitioner in habeas 
corpus contended that the sentence or judgment by vir-
tue of which he was in confinement was void for the 
reason his trial was not conducted in pursuance of law 
in that the jury was not chosen pursuant to a valid law. 
The petition was of course denied, this being merely a 
matter of procedure. The court stated: 
''The important and decisive question, which 
confronts us at the outset, is, can this court, in a 
collateral proceeding by habeas corpus, look be-
yond the judgment, and determine questions 
which arose during the trial of the case, and 
which, if they had been presented in the record 
on appeal, might have resulted in a reversal of 
the judgment~ We think not. The warrant ap-
pears fair and regular on its face, and that the 
district court in which the case was tried had 
jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter is 
not, and cannot be successfully, questioned. This 
being so, and that court being a court of record, 
its judgment is binding upon all the world until 
reversed in a regular way by appeal. A fortiori 
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is this so after the judgtnent has been affirmed 
by this court. Such a judgn1ent is final, and pro-
nounces the law of the case. With what propriety, 
then, can this court, by Ineans of habeas corpus, 
substantially reverse a judgment which the law 
has placed beyond our control'? The prisoner's 
detention under the judgn1ent, the commitment 
being regular on its face, cannot be unlawful un-
less that judgment is absolutely null and void; 
and it cannot be null and void, when the court 
had general jurisdiction of the person and sub-
ject-matter, even though it may have erred in its 
proceedings during the trial. Irregularities and 
mere errors in proceedings will not render a judg-
ment an absolute nullity, although they may ren-
der it voidable, and when voidable only it is con-
clusively presumed to be valid until reversed, and 
it cannot be reversed by habeas corpus, because 
habeas corpus does not authorize the exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction; and 'no inquiry,' says 
Chancellor Kent, 'is to be made into the legality 
of any process, judgment, or decree, * * * where 
the party is detained under the final decree or 
judgment of a competent court.' 2 Kent, Comm. 
30. The district court being a court of general 
jurisdiction, the offense charged against the pri-
soner was cognizable in that court, and it was 
competent to inflict the punishment provided by 
law for the offense of which the prisoner was 
convicted; and its judgment, not being reversed, 
has all the obligation which the judgment of any 
tribunal can have. 
''If the judgment be voidable only, and hence 
obligatory, because not reversed, we cannot look 
beyond it on habeas corpus. If it be absolutely 
void, the officer who detains the prisoner and 
obeys the judgment is guilty of false imprison-
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12 
men f. Would counsel for the prisoner in this case 
undertake to maintain the position that the officer 
is guilty of false imprisonment~ Clearly, the de-
tention is authorized by the judgment and warrant 
and the irr..J]risonment is not illegal. 'The habeas 
corpus is undoubtedly an immediate remedy for 
every illegal imprisonment. But no imprisonment 
is illegal where the process is a justification of 
the officer; and process, whether by writ or war-
rant, is legal whenever it is not defective in the 
frame of it, and has issued, in the ordinary course 
of justice, from a court or magistrate having jur-
isdiction of the subject-matter, though there have 
been error in the proceedings previous to the is-
suing of it.' Com. vs. Lecky, 1 Watts, 66." 
In the committment of Demmick it should be noted 
that when judgment was rendered execution was stayed 
until January 4, 1943. On that day execution issued. 
No hearing was necessary and no question of jurisdic-
tion can be involved. 
Counsel for plaintiffs herein cite and quote from 
Atwood vs. Cox, 88 utah 437, 55 P. 2d 377 (1936) to 
the effect that where the pleading shows on its face that 
· the subject matter in regard to which jurisdiction is 
attempted to be invoked is one over which the court has 
no jurisdiction then the court has no jurisdiction to go 
any further than to decide to refuse to take cognizance. 
What is the subject matter of the.~hompson criminal 
· prosecution? He was charged with robbery and being 
an habitual criminal. That is of necessity the subject 
matter. 
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In the Atwood case jurisdiction is said to be: 
'' * * * the power or capacity given by law to 
a court, tribunal, board body or officer to enter-
tain, hear and detennine certain controversies.'' 
The controYersy in the Thompson case was whether 
Thon1pson was guilty of robbery and being an habitual 
crin1inal. Certainly the District Court, a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction had the power to determine this con-
troversy. If that court did not have that power, then 
under the Utah constitution and statutes no court had 
that power. 
The same is, of course, true 1n the case against 
Demmick. 
It should also be remembered that the Atwood case 
concerned a writ of prohibition and the opinion indicates 
that the courts have somewhat broadened the scope of 
that writ because of a feeling that the remedy of appeal 
,,-as ineffectual in some cases and the writ was issued 
to prevent inferior courts from acting in a way that in-
jury might be done and which could not be corrected. 
This Court has held that prohibition will issue where 
the complaint against a public officer to remove him 
fr01n office does not state a course of action. This is 
apparently accounted for on the theory that any order 
made under such complaint would directly affect the 
property right of such officer in his office and unless 
the writ is~ue there is no other available or adequate 
remedy to protect him. 
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It would certainly be a sorry state of affairs if this 
Court holds that the sufficiency of an information can 
be tested by habeas corpus. A person held under an 
information and awaiting trial could have the informa-
tion tested in this Court and trial would not likely be 
held until such matter was decided. At any time after 
conviction proceedings of this kind could be maintained. 
Criminal litigation would never be completed. 
We submit that under the foregoing argument and 
authorities the proceedings here instituted by Plaintiffs 
can only require a determination of whether 103-1-18, 
R.S.U. 1933 has been repealed. 
POINT 2 
SECTION 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 HAS NOT BEEN 
HEPEALED BY I~IPLICATION OR OTHERWISE. 
This point is in answer to point 2 of Plaintiff's brief. 
That repeals by imp~ication are not favored needs 
the citation of no authorities. It is only when necessity 
requires such a holding that the courts hold there has 
been a repeal by implication. 
Section 103-1-18 was re ... enacted by the Legislature 
in 1933, along with section 105-36-20. See State Tax 
Commission vs. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 P. 2d 171 
( 1936). Both sections must be given effect. There is no 
inconsistency between them that requires disregard of 
one of them. This Court has held that an indeterminate 
sentence is a sentence for the maximum period provided 
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by law for the particular offense involved. Mutart vs. 
Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1907); Lee Lim vs. Davis, 
75 Utah 245, 284 P. 323, 76 L.R. 460 (1929); State vs. 
Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P. 2d 584 (1937). If the max-
imum tern1 is for three years or n1ore, it is a term for not 
less than three years. Haley vs. Hollowell 208 Iowa 
1205, 227 N.vV. 165 (1929). 
If we are to speculate on legislative intent it can 
certainly be said that the legislature by the Indetermin-
ate Sentence Law knew that it was providing that e.ach 
sentence thereunder was for the maximum term and de-
sired that th~ habitual criminal statute should apply 
thereto because it did not mention that statute and did 
not repeal it. 
We submit that counsel for plaintiffs misconceive 
the effect of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The 
Board of Pardons was not giv~n by that act any power 
which it did not already possess by virtue of the Con-
stitution. The Board both before and after had the pow-
er to commute punishments (which includes the power 
of parole, State ex rel. Bishop vs. State Board of Cor-
rections, 16 Utah 478, 52 P. 1090 (1898)) grant pardons, 
etc. Time served under a so-called ''judge-made'' sen-
tence could be c~t down by the Board. 
Counsel also states that "No sentence was definite 
within the permissible minimum and maximum limits.'' 
This Court has held that indeterminate sentences are 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
definite, they are for the maximum term. What the 
Board of Pardons does or may do is not a part of the 
sentence. It can not alter the fact that a person has been 
sentenced and committed for the maximum period. 
We submit that said section 103-1-18 has not been 
repealed by implication or otherwise. 
POINT 3 
IN EACH CASE IT APPEARS FROl\1: THE IN-
FORMATION THAT PLAINTIFFS HEREIN HAD 
BEEN EACH TWICE SENTENCED AND COMMIT-
TED TO PRISON FOR TERMS OF NOT LESS THAN 
~rHREE YEARS PREVIOUS TO THE CRIMES 
CHARGED THEREIN. 
This point is in answer to point 1 in Plaintiffs' 
Brief except we will not here consider the jurisdictional 
question there mentioned. We believe that this has been 
disposed of under Point 1 hereof. 
In the Thompson case the previous sentences and 
committments relied on were an Idaho sentence and com-
mittment for a term of not less than one or more than 
fifteen years and a Utah sentence and committment for · 
a term of not less than five years to life. 
In the Demmick case the previous sentences and 
committments relied on were a Utah sentence and com-
mittment for a term not exceeding five years and a 
California sentence and committment for a term of not 
less or more than fifteen years. · 
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Under the cases heretofore cited these were all sen-
tences and con1n1ittments for the maximum terms there-
in specified. In each instance the maximum was for not 
less than three y,ears. See Point 1, Respondent's Brief 
in State vs. \Valsh, Case No. 6643. 
POINT 4 
THE VERDICTS IN BOTH CASES HERE IN-
VOLVED vVERE PROPER AND LEGAL. 
This is in answer to Point 3 contained in Plaintiffs' 
Brief. 
These verdicts were in compliance with the charges 
contained in the informations. By these verdicts the 
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiffs 
herein committed the crimes charged in the informations 
and that each had been twice previously convicted, sen-
tenced and committed as alleged in said informations. 
These verdicts were necessary in order that the court 
could impose the enhanced punishment provided for by 
said section, 103-1-18. State vs. Findling, 123 Minn. 413, 
144 N.W., 142, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 499 (1913). 
POINT 5 
UNDER SECTION 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 IT WAS 
NOT N"ECESSARY THAT PLAINTIFFS HAD BEEN 
CONVICTED OF THREE FELONIES BEFORE PRO-
CEEDINGS COULD BE COl\IMENCED TO DETER-
MINE WHETHER THEY WERE HABITUAL CRIM-
INALS. 
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This is in answer to Point 4 of Plaintiffs' Brief, ex-
cept the jurisdictional problem covered herein under 
Point 1. 
As we understand Plaintiffs' argument, it is their 
contention that until after the conviction of Plaintiffs' 
on the third felony no proceedings could be had under 
said section 103-1-18. This is but a matter of procedure. 
From all that appears here Plaintiffs' did not raise this 
question in the trial of these cases. If this were an appeal 
there is nothing in the record to show that this matter 
could be raised. They may have consented to this pro-
cedure. 
However, we submit that the proper procedure was 
here followed and the Plaintiffs were properly informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them 
and were tried by a jury on the issues raised by their 
pleas. See Point 2, Respondent's Brief, State vs. Walsh, 
Case No. 6643. 
Section 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 provides: 
''Whoever has been previously twice con-
victed of crime, sentenced and committed to pri-
son, in this or any other state, or once in this and 
once ·at least in any other state, for terms of not 
less than three . years. each, shall, upon conviction 
.. of' a 'felony- committed in this sta-te; other than 
murder in Jhe first o:r second degree, be deemed 
to be- an. habitual criminal, and shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state prison for not less 
than fifteen years; provided, that if the person 
so convicted shall show to the satisfaction of the 
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court before which such conviction is had that 
he was released from imprisonn1ent upon either 
of such sentences upon a pardon granted on the 
ground that he was innocent, such conviction and 
sentence shall not be considered as such under 
this section.'' 
Counsel for Plaintiffs contend that the word "upon" 
means after. If the Legislature 1neant after why did it 
not us~ the word after~ Then, too, how long after. 
Upon conviction here means at the time of convic-
tion. At the time of conviction of the third felony he 
shall be deemed to be an habitual criminal. At the time 
of that conviction something must precede it in the way 
of a determination that he had been twice previously 
convicted before he can be deemed an habitual criminal. 
How else that determination can be made in a court of 
law other than upon pleading and proof we do not know. 
Counsel does not enlighten us. If the statute indicates 
any procedure it is the procedure here followed: 
POINT 6-
THE COMMITTMENT _ OF_ DEMMIGK __ WAS 
-LEGAL. 
This is an answer to Point 5 of Plaintiffs' Brief. 
At the time Demmick was sentenced .on. November 
-2_8, 1942, he was granted a stay of_.execution only _until 
January 4, 194-3. No further stay was granted and com,-
mittment issued on that date. 
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This case is entirely different from State vs. Zolan-
takis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 54 A.L.R. 1463. There 
sentence was suspended during good behavior. There 
was no fixed date to which it was suspended. It was an 
indefinite suspension. The court held that in order to 
revoke this suspension it was necessary that a pleading 
be filed for such purpose, issues drawn and a hearing 
held. In the case at bar there was nothing to revoke, 
the stay granted expired and the committment issued. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not an appeal. Only jurisdictional problems 
can be determined in habeas corpus. 
We submit that section 103-1-18 has not been re-
pealed and that that is the only problem here involved. 
H·owever we believe that there is not even error in the 
other matters raised by Plaintiffs and that the fore-
going authorities and arguments confirm this statement. 
Even though error was committed, Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to an absolute discharge. They were still 
convicted of the felonies of robbery, burglary and grand 
larceny and should be sentenced therefor. Under Mu-
tart vs. Pratt, supra, even though the sentences here are 
erroneously set forth m tlie judgment, this Court can 
'Consid~r ihem as the sentence provided. by law for the 
feloni~s ot which they were properly convicted. In any 
event "they should be remanded for proper sentence as 
was done in Ex parte Folck, Folck vs. Watson, supra. 
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We submit that the writ should be denied. 
Hespectfully submitted, 
GHOVEH A. GILES, 
ZAR E. HAYES 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS. 
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